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This paper advances Kim, Taber, and Lodge's work (2010). It is shown here that the psychological
model of political judgment named John Q. Public (Kim, Taber, and Lodge 2010) is consistent with a
set of well-known empirical regularities repeatedly found in electoral and psychological researches,
that the model in general implies motivated reasoning - discounting contradictory information to the
prior while accepting consistent information more or less at its face value - under general conditions,
and that (prior) evaluative affect towards candidates plays a fundamental role in this process. It is
also discussed the implication of motivated reasoning in accounting for the responsiveness,
persistence, and polarization of candidate evaluation often observed in elections.
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 Introduction
Students of political behavior have long debated about how people form and revise their judgments
and beliefs about political objects (candidates, parties, groups, and issues). Two theoretical
perspectives have dominated the debates for decades. One view suggests that political beliefs and
attitudes are strongly inﬂuenced by socialization, develop inertia through time, and thus are not very
responsive to contemporary information from the political environment (Campbell, Converse, Miller,
and Stokes 1960; Niemi and Jennings 1991). An alternative perspective posits that beliefs and
attitudes are highly responsive to contemporary information and thus continually change over time
responding to changes in the political environment (Downs 1957; Page and Shapiro 1992). These
two perspectives have been repeatedly mapped onto various controversies over whether news and
campaigns matter or whether party identiﬁcation is stable.
In a recent study, however, Kim, Taber, and Lodge (2010) provided an alternative perspective.
According to them, ordinary citizens often engage in motivated reasoning - discounting information
contrary to priors while accepting consistent information more or less as it is - and thus their political
attitudes and beliefs are inherently both responsive and persistent.
Using National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) 2000[1], they showed that voters' candidate
evaluations changed responding to campaign information (responsive), but only within relatively
small ranges constrained by priors (persistent), and became more extreme over time (polarized).
Applying a psychological model and a general Bayesian learning model (Gerber and Greene 1998),
they showed that motivated reasoning is a key factor to account for these dynamics of candidate
evaluation.
Speciﬁcally, they showed via simulations that: their model named John Q. Public (JQP) can account
for the responsiveness, persistence, and polarization of candidate evaluation while the Bayesian
model has a fundamental difﬁculty accounting for the persistence and polarization; and motivated
reasoning is a key factor for this discrepancy, that is, JQP implies motivated reasoning but the
Bayesian model does not and this is why their performance differed in a fundamental way.








In other words, they have not fully established the internal validity of the study (Gal￡n, Izquierdo,
Izquierdo, Santos, Olmo, L￳pez-Paredes, and Edmonds, 2009). Also, they have not examined
whether the model is consistent with other well-established empirical regularities found in electoral
and psychological research.
The purpose of this study is to advance Kim, Taber, and Lodge's (2010) work. Speciﬁcally, this paper
examines whether and how JQP implies motivated reasoning and also investigates whether the
model is consistent with such well-known empirical phenomena as spreading activation (Neely
1976), affective priming effect (Fazio 2001), survey order and wording effects (Tourangeau, Rips,
and Rasinski 2000), on-line processing (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995), and memory-based
processing (Zaller and Feldman 1992). It also discusses the implication of motivated reasoning in
accounting for the responsiveness, persistence, and polarization of candidate evaluation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. The third section explains
experimental setup. The fourth section presents and discusses simulation results. The last section
concludes. Appendix provides the source code of the model and information about how to replicate
the results reported in this paper.
 Model
Kim, Taber, and Lodge (2010) proposed a psychological model of political judgment (JQP) that
integrates contemporary theories in political behavior, most notably the on-line (Lodge, Steenbergen,
and Brau 1995) and memory-based information processing (Zaller and Feldman 1992; Tourangeau,
Rips, and Rasinski 2000), based on the classic cognitive paradigm embedded in the ACT-R cognitive
architecture (Anderson et al. 2004)[2].
Speciﬁcally, the model integrates cognitive and affective structures and mechanisms into one
framework[3]: (1) an associative network representation of knowledge and attitudes in long-term
memory (LTM), (2) activation and decay mechanisms for concepts in LTM, which determine what
information is accessible for retrieval into conscious working memory (WM), (3) processes for the
construction of attitudes from accessible information in memory, and (4) processes for updating
attitudes.
Knowledge and Attitude Representation
The theoretical framework for knowledge and attitude representation of the model is based on the
classic node-link associative network framework built-into ACT-R. However, it also differs from the
classical framework in that it incorporates attitudes towards objects. In particular, the model brings
evaluative affect center stage: one's likes and dislikes for "objects" in memory (e.g., leaders, groups,
and issues) play a central role in the model.
There is strong evidence that virtually all social concepts in memory are affectively charged. With
repeated co-activation socio-political concepts become positively or negatively charged and this
affective evaluation - positive, negative, or both, strong or weak - appears to be linked directly to its
conceptual representation in long-term memory (Abelson 1963; Lodge and Taber 2005). Moreover,
these evaluative feelings of political parties, candidates, and issues come into play automatically on
exposure to new information (Lodge and Taber 2000).
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical framework for memory processes, using part of the knowledge
structure about George W. Bush of a typical, liberal voter. Each node or concept in LTM is
represented by an oval, the border-thickness of which varies to indicate differences in their base
level accessibility. For the conﬂicted liberal shown in the ﬁgure, the traits such as honest,
hypocritical, and trustworthy are all quite accessible, while policy issues such as tax cut and pro-life
are less accessible.
Associations (or implicational relations) between pairs of nodes are represented by connecting lines
of varying thickness, which indicates difference in the strength of association. So conservative,
Republican, hypocritical, and pro-life are more closely associated with Bush in this liberal voter's
belief system than are Bush's other traits and issues. Such nodes as bumbler and gays-in-military
are not associated with Bush, implying that their associations with Bush have not been experienced
yet.2.7
2.8
Figure 1. Knowledge Structure about Bush for a Liberal Voter
Plus and minus signs (evaluative tags) linked to the nodes represent positive and negative affect
about the memory objects. A summary evaluative judgment of an object may be obtained by
combining the positive and negative valences. Finally, every aspect of the knowledge structure - the
base level accessibility, the strength of associations between nodes, and the valence and strength of
evaluative affect - changes as this liberal voter encounters new information about Bush.
Accessibility of Memory Objects
Objects in long term memory (LTM) vary in their accessibilities (how easily and quickly they may be
retrieved into conscious working memory (WM)) as a function of (1) the frequency and recency of
past retrievals, (2) activation spread to the node from associated concepts currently being
processed (spreading activation, as when thinking about Barack Obama facilitates the retrieval of an
associated concept, "President"), (3) the affective congruency between the node and information
currently being processed (affective priming effect, as when thinking about a negative concept like
"terrorism" activates other negative concepts), and (4) the decay of accessibility through time and








These inﬂuences on accessibility, with the exception of affective priming, are part of the classic
cognitive paradigm and are built into the ACT-R. Affective priming effect, however, requires further
elaboration and development of additional procedure for the model.
Hundreds of experiments document that affect towards an attitude object (e.g., a negative feeling
about George W. Bush) automatically comes to mind even upon a mere exposure to stimuli (e.g., the
word 'George W. Bush' in a newspaper headline) with little or no pre or post conscious appraisal.
Moreover, not only can affect be triggered automatically but it is also primary in the sense that it
enters information-processing stream before cognitive appraisals (Zajonc 2000).
In addition, experimental studies on affective priming show that once retrieved affect automatically
inﬂuences the accessibility of other objects in LTM such that those affectively congruent with it
become more accessible while those incongruent less accessible, regardless of semantic
associations between them. This affective priming effect has been demonstrated for ordinary words,
simple line drawings, real life color pictures, and odors (Bargh et al. 1992; Hermans et al. 1994;
Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh 1999; Hermans, Baeyens, & Eelen 1998).
JQP's accessibility (or activation) mechanism, which determines the accessibility of a concept node
in LTM at a given moment in time, is an operationalization of these inﬂuences. More precisely,
where Ai is the accessibility or activation level of node i, Bi is the base level accessibility of node i
(given in Equation 2), node j is the information currently being processed (held in WM), W j is the
attention weight for node j, Sji is the strength of association between nodes j and i, Fj is the number of
nodes linked to node j, ʳ > 0 is a parameter governing the magnitude of affective priming effect, Cji is
a trichotomous indicator of affective congruency between nodes j and i, and N (0, ˃2) is normally
distributed noise with mean 0 and standard deviation ˃.
The baseline accessibility ( Bi) includes the residual effects on the accessibility of node i of past
processing and memory decay. Speciﬁcally,
where Bi is the baseline accessibility of i, M is the number of times i has been retrieved into WM in
the past, Tm is the elapsed time since i was retrieved m -th time, d is a parameter representing the
rate of memory decay. So Bi increases with the number of times i has been retrieved and with the
recency of those retrievals, and it decays through time and disuse.
The term following the summation sign in Equation 1 represents the cumulative effects of nodes
currently being processed (js), which consists of spreading activation, Sji - ln( Fj), and affective
priming effect, ʳCji. Sji represents the strength of association between node j and i, which is an
increasing function of incidents where an association between j and i has been experienced
(associative learning, Anderson 1993).[4] Both spreading activation and affective priming effects are
limited by the amount of focus ( Wj) that may be given to node j, which is normally set at 1/ n to
represent the diminishing inﬂuence of any given concept when the number of concepts currently held
in WM increases. Another cognitive limitation built into Equation 1 is the fan effect, ln( Fj), which
restricts the amount of activation that spreads from node j to i when j is linked to a large number of
nodes in LTM.
Given the mechanism, observe that the accessibility of a node in LTM depends on which information
is currently held in WM. For instance, if the liberal voter in Figure 1 reads "George W. Bush" in a
newspaper headline, node Bush along with the evaluative affect associated with it in LTM will be
immediately retrieved into WM. And once retrieved, it will automatically inﬂuence the accessibility of
the other nodes in LTM through spreading activation and affective priming effect. Speciﬁcally,
activation will spread from Bush to the nodes associated with him in LTM (e.g., Republican and
conservative) making them more accessible. And those affectively congruent with him (e.g.,
Republican, hypocritical, bumbler) will become more accessible while those incongruent (e.g.,
honest, knowledgeable, pro-abortion) get less accessible. These inﬂuences from node Bush,







Given the automaticity and primacy of affect, it is clear that an evaluation of attitude object will be ﬁrst
inﬂuenced by the evaluative affect attached to the object. However, studies on survey response
suggest that the evaluation is likely to be further inﬂuenced by the considerations that come to mind
at the time of judgment (Zaller and Feldman 1992;Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000). That is, an
evaluation of attitude object (e.g., George W. Bush) appears to be constructed on the spot, reﬂecting
different and often conﬂicting considerations (e.g., Bush is Republican, Bush is hypocritical, Bush is
knowledgeable) that happen to come to mind at the moment.
Equation 3 provides a mechanism for this evaluation construction process.
where CAi is the constructed evaluation of node i, OLi is the existing evaluative tag for node i, OLj is
the existing evaluative tag for node j that is accessible ( Aj > 0) at the time of attitude construction, aj
is the normalized accessibility of j, and ʴ is a parameter that controls the inﬂuence from other
considerations (the node js) on the constructed evaluation relative to its existing evaluative tag. Note
that nodes that are not currently accessible ( Aj ≤ 0) would not inﬂuence the evaluation at all.
On-line Processing of Attitudes
There is substantial evidence that attitudes are routinely updated on-line, at the time when relevant
information is encountered (Hastie and Pennington 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995).
Speciﬁcally, when an individual encounters new information about an attitude object, she brings its
evaluative affect into WM, updates it using the information, and then stores it back to memory.
Moreover, after updating the evaluation, the individual may forget the information used to update the
evaluation. In this way, individuals maintain a running, on-line tally for an attitude object in memory.
Equation 4 provides a speciﬁc mechanism for on-line processing:
where OLi is the evaluative tag for node i after processing K pieces of information, ˁ is a parameter
that governs the weight of new relative to old information, and CAjk is the attitude toward object j
(constructed by Equation 3) associated with node i at processing stage k. Notice that 0 < ˁ < 1
implies the evaluative affect would become more persistent as more information is learned about an
object.
It is the constructed implication (CAjk)of information that is integrated into the evaluative tag for an
attitude object. For instance, when the liberal voter shown in Figure 1 encounters a campaign
message, "Bush is honest", such negative concepts as "hypocritical", "Republican", and
"conservative" in memory are likely to come to mind to inﬂuence the perception of the information[5].
The resulting, perceived implication of the information is then integrated into the evaluative affect of
Bush.
 Simulation
The simulation was conducted in the following way. First, average knowledge structures for 5 self-
identiﬁed ideological groups - strong conservatives, conservatives, moderates, liberals, and strong
liberals - were identiﬁed based on the same empirical data used in Kim et al. (2010). Second, ﬁve
agents were initialized each with one of the ﬁve ideological belief structures. Third, the agents then
processed a set of information about two ﬁctitious candidates, James (Democrat) and Edward
(Republican). The information consisted of two parts: basic information about the candidate's party
afﬁlation, issue stances, and personality and campaign information that mimic the typical ﬂow of
campaign information in real elections. Fourth, the agents were asked to evaluate the candidates






the order in which the information was presented and wordings of the information were manipulated
to examine information order and wording effects. Also, an additional simple experiment was
conducted to examine motivated reasoning.
Initial Knowledge Structure
Knowledge structures of the agents were generated in the same way as in Kim et al. (2010) using
primarily the cross-sectional data from NAES 2000 (Romer, Kenski, Waldman, Adasiewicz, and
Jamieson 2003). Speciﬁcally, for each of the 5 self-identiﬁed ideological groups among the NAES
2000 survey respondents, the mean and variance for ratings of parties, groups, and issues as well
as the item response rates were obtained.
Five agents' initial knowledge structures were then generated using one of these ideological belief
structures. First, memory objects (nodes in Figure 1) were created for each political (e.g., Republican
party, pro-life, tax cut, etc.) and trait concept (e.g., honest, trustworthy, etc.). The evaluative tags for
political concepts were assigned according to the mean ratings for the given ideological subgroup.
Their initial attitudinal stability (k in Equation 4) and baseline accessibility were set using item
response rates for the given ideological subgroup as a proxy for the frequency and recency of use.
The evaluative tags for trait concepts were assigned consulting Affective Norms for English Words
(Bradley and Lang 1999), which provide means and standard deviations of ratings for a large number
of trait concepts. Their attitudinal stability and baseline accessibility assumed to be high[6], since
voters are likely to use these concepts more often than political concepts.
No prior knowledge about the candidates was included in the initial knowledge structure because
they were ﬁctitious. In terms of Figure 1, node Edwards and James were included in LTM with no
evaluative tags, no association with any other nodes, and lower baseline accessibility than others.
Campaign Information
Table 1 lists the information used in the simulation experiment. First 16 statements provide basic
information about the candidates, including their party afﬁliations, stances on major policy issues,
and personality traits. The remaining 18 statements mimic the ﬂow of typical campaign information in
real elections. As such, they include both positive and negative information about the candidates.
Candidates' issue stances are setup to be largely consistent with their party afﬁliations.
The statements were coded in a format accessible to JQP: a simple statement attributable to some
known actor. Each of these statements represent the gist meaning of a campaign message. Though
many subtleties are certainly smoothed away in this process, as Kim et al. (2010) pointed out, there
are also beneﬁts. In particular, there is some evidence that citizens in fact process the gist meaning
of campaign statements and ignore even not-so-subtle qualiﬁcations (Hamill and Lodge 1985; Lodge,
Steenbergen, and Brau 1995)[7].
Table 1: Information used in the Simulation
Order Statements
Basic Information
1 (Edwards says) Edwards is a Republican
2 (Edwards says) Edwards supports tax-cut
3 (Edwards says) Edwards opposes abortion-rights
4 (Edwards says) Edwards supports school-voucher
5 (Edwards says) Edwards supports defense-spending-increase
6 (Edwards says) Edwards opposes partisan-politics
7 (Edwards says) Edwards is trustworthy
8 (Edwards says) Edwards is sympathetic
9 (James says) James is a Democrat
10 (James says) James opposes tax-cut
11 (James says) James supports afﬁrmative-action
12 (James says) James supports abortion-rights
13 (James says) James supports gays-in-military




15 (James says) James is trustworthy
16 (James says) James is intelligent
Campaign Information
17 (Edwards says) Edwards is a Republican
18 (James says) James is a Democrat
19 (Edwards says) Edwards supports tax-cut
20 (Edwards says) tax-cut is reasonable
21 (James says) James opposes tax-cut
22 (James says) tax-cut is risky
23 (Edwards says) James is dishonest
24 (James says) Edwards is dishonest
25 (Edwards says) James is a squanderer
26 (James says) Edwards is a bumbler
27 (Edwards says) Edwards opposes afﬁrmative-action
28 (James says) James opposes school-voucher
29 (Edwards says) Edwards opposes gays-in-military
30 (James says) James opposes defense-spending-increase
31 (Edwards says) Edwards supports gun-control
32 (James says) James supports gun-control
33 (Edwards says) Edwards supports death-penalty
34 (James says) James supports death-penalty
Parameter Values
The parameter values used in the experiment were ʳ = 2, ʴ = 0.67, ˁ = 0.91, and ˃ = 0. The random
noise was set at 0 to make the presentation clearer. The parameters speciﬁc to ACT-R were set to
their default or common values (e.g. d = 0.5. For details, see Appendix). As we will see, however,
particular parameter values do not really matter for the results reported in this study; qualitatively the
same results can be obtained under wide ranges of parameter values.
 Result and Discussion
Integration of information into Candidate Evaluation:
On-line and Memory-based Processing
Figure 2 and 3 show how JQP integrates information into candidate evaluation. Figure 2 plots the
evaluative affect for Edwards as the ﬁve agents processed the basic information (ﬁrst 16
statements) in Table 1.
As can be seen, the agents developed evaluative affect towards Edwards over time responding to
the information. For each agent, the evaluative affect became more positive (or less negative)
whenever positive information was encountered and less positive whenever negative information
was received. And it remained unchanged when no relevant information was processed (from 9 th to
16 th statements, which were about not Edwards but James). This is precisely what the on-line
processing model would predict.
Also, the information encountered earlier had a greater impact than those encountered later, implying
that the evaluative feeling becomes more resistant to change as the agents learn more about
Edwards. In the end, the liberal, moderate, and conservative agents developed negative, somewhat
positive, and positive feeling about Edwards respectively.4.4
4.5
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Figure 2. Changes in Evaluative Affect of Edwards over time
Figure 3. Evaluative affect and Constructed Evaluation
Figure 3 compares the evaluative affect and the constructed evaluation of Edwards after the agents
processed the basic information. The constructed evaluation differs from the evaluative affect
because it reﬂects not only the feeling associated with the candidates but also considerations that
come to mind at the time of evaluation, which is what the memory-based processing models
postulate.
Practice and Recency, Spreading Activation, and Affective Priming Effect
Figure 4 and 5 examine how the accessibility mechanism of JQP works. Figure 4 (a) plots the
baseline accessibility of node Edwards and tax-cut as liberal JQP processed the campaign
information (the last 18 statements) in Table 1. Since "Edwards" appeared quite often in the
statements, the baseline accessibility of Edwards gradually increased over time with occasional
declines due to memory decay. By contrast, because "tax cut" appeared only a couple of times in the
information, that of tax-cut gradually decreased (except when 19 th through 22 nd statements were
processed).
Figure 4 (b) plots the full accessibility - the sum of baseline accessibility, spreading activation, and
affective priming effect - of node Edwards as the agent 'read' 17 th through 24 th statements. Since
spreading activation and affective priming effect depend on the concept node momentarily held in4.7
4.8
WM, the full accessibility of Edwards quickly changes as different concepts are retrieved into and
cleared from WM processing the statements. This is why we see many upward and downward
spikes in the graph.
Figure 4. Accessibility of Memory Objects
Figure 5 provides a more detailed picture. It plots the baseline accessibility, that plus spreading
activation effect, and the full accessibility of node tax-cut right after the agent read "Edwards" in
"Edwards supports tax cut" (the 19th statement), that is, with node Edwards retrieved and held in
WM.[8] In the context of a priming experiment, Edwards is a prime and tax cut is a target.
As one can see, the accessibility of tax-cut got a boost from both spreading activation and affective
priming effects since it was semantically associated and affectively congruent with Edwards at the
time of processing the information: tax-cut was associated with Edwards after processing the 2nd
statement in Table 1 and both were negatively charged due to the processing of ﬁrst 18 statements
given the agent's liberal belief structure. The full accessibility of tax-cut will change when Edwards,
the source of spreading activation and affective priming effect, is cleared from WM. The accessibility




Figure 5. Priming Effect
Information Order and Wording Effect
Figure 6 compares conservative JQP's (constructed) evaluations of the candidates after all 34
statements in Table 1 were processed, when they were presented as they are in the table, with
different order, and with different wordings respectively. For order effect, the presentation order of two
negative statements "Edwards says James is dishonest" and "James says Edward is dishonest"
were changed from 23 rd and 24 th to 33 rd and 34 th respectively. For wording effect, the wordings of
the 8 th and 16 th statement changed from "sympathetic" and "intelligent" into "warm-hearted" and
"smart" respectively.
With changed order, the evaluations of both James and Edwards somewhat decreased. It is because
now the negative information were presented more recently thus exerted more inﬂuence on the
evaluation. This is precisely what Zaller and Feldman (1992) argued; the more recently is a piece of
information encountered, the stronger will its impact on the evaluation be.
More generally, the order effect in JQP is determined by two opposing forces. A change in
information order inﬂuences both its accessibility and the order it is integrated into the evaluative
affect of an attitude object. If a piece of information about an attitude object were presented later, then
all else being equal its accessibility would become higher thus exert a greater impact on the
evaluation, while its impact on the evaluative affect of the object would get weaker (on-line updating
in Equation 4 with 0 < ˁ < 1). the overall order effect will be determined by the net of these two
opposing effects (Anderson 1965).
When different wordings were used, the evaluation of Edward increased while that of James
decreased. It is because "warm-hearted" is more positive than "sympathetic" while "smart" is less
positive than "intelligent" (Bradley and Lang 1999). Though this wording effect can get quite





Figure 6. Information Order and Wording Effect
In all, the results so far show that the model is in fact consistent a number of well-established
empirical ﬁndings in electoral and psychological researches including on-line and memory-based
information processing, practice and recency effects, spreading activation and affective priming
effect, and information order and wording effects.
Motivated Reasoning
In order to examine whether and how JQP models motivated reasoning, an additional simple
experiment was conducted. Speciﬁcally, after the 5 ideological agents read the statements in Table 1,
two additional pieces of information about each candidate were presented to them. These two pieces
of information were set up to be identical across candidates and have opposite valences with equal
strength; the ﬁrst information was negative, the second was positive, and the sum of their valence
was equal to zero.[9]
The same information were also presented to 5 Bayesian agents, which were set up to be identical
with the JQP agents in all aspects except that they update candidate evaluations according to
Bayes' rule[10]. A particular weight given to new information in Bayes' rule is not important here. What
is important is that this updating rule, in fact Bayesian principle in general, does not distinguish
information based on its consistency with priors. That is, it gives the same weight to information
whether it is consistent or contradictory to the prior.[11] Consequently, it provides a baseline case for
a comparson with motivated reasoning.
Figure 7 compares the conservative JQP's evaluations of James and Edwards with those of
corresponding Bayesian agent as they process the information. The other ideological agents'







Figure 7. Motivated Reasoning
As one can see, both JQP and Bayesian agents' candidate evaluations changed responding to the
information, decreasing after the negative information and increasing after the positive information.
However, their responses also differed in a fundamental way.
For the conservative Bayesian agent, the impact of negative information was far greater on the
evaluation of Edwards than James, and that of positive information was greater on James than
Edwards. In other words, the effect of attitudinally contradictory information was greater than that of
consistent information (since this conservative Bayesian agent's prior evaluations of James and
Edwards were negative and positive respectively). As a result, the evaluations got moderated over
time.
For the JQP agent, conversely, there was little difference between consistent and contradictory
information in terms of their impacts on the evaluation. Consequently, the evaluations of James and
Edwards moved more or less in parallel (for more discussion about this parallel change, see Bartels
(2002)).
This result directly shows that JQP models motivated reasoning. Since the Bayesian model gives
the same weight to incoming information and any difference between the two models must come from
the difference in their updating mechanism by setup, JQP must have put less weight on contradictory
information than consistent information, which is motivated reasoning.
Why would this be the case? In effect, it is because the prior knowledge structure in JQP is not
merely an anchor as in Bayesian updating but inﬂuences the ways information is processed and
used. Speciﬁcally, when JQP encounters a piece of campaign information the prior beliefs and
attitudes inﬂuence how the information will be perceived; and when JQP evaluates a candidate they
affect how information will be used to form the evaluation.
Figure 8 compares the perceived implications ( CAj in Equation 4) of the information presented to the
agent when it was attitudinally congruent and when it was contradictory. As can be seen, the same
information was discounted when it was attitudinally contrary to the prior compared to when it was
consistent. To be speciﬁc, the ﬁrst (negative) information was perceived less negatively when it was
about Edwards than when it was about James, and the second (positive) information was perceived
less positively when it was about James than when it was about Edwards.
It is because the prior beliefs and attitudes about the candidates, which the agent developed from
processing the information in Table 1, come into play when the information was processed. For
instance, when this conservative JQP encountered a positive information, say, "James is
trustworthy", such negative concepts as "Democrat", "dishonest", and "pro-choice" would come to
mind to make the information seem less positive than it actually is. Conversely, if the agent
encountered a negative information, "Edwards is trustworthy", positive considerations like
"Republican", "honest", and "pro-life" would be retrieved, but these positive considerations would not
necessarily make the information seem less positive. In fact, they may make it look more positive
than it is.
Though not shown here, the prior knowledge structure inﬂuences how information is used in
evaluation construction process as well. In general, when JQP is asked to evaluate a candidate the
information in memory that favors priors will be weighted more heavily.4.24
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Figure 8. Consistent vs Contradictory Information
Evaluative affect plays a critical role in these processes - both when information is processed and
when a candidate is evaluated - via affective priming effect, that is, by facilitating the retrieval of
congruent information while inhibiting incongruent information. In general, the stronger is affective
priming effect, the stronger will be motivated reasoning and the more persistent will be candidate
evaluation.
Figure 9 compares the difference in evaluation of Edwards and James before and after the
conservative JQP processed the 4 pieces of information, when the degree of affective priming effect
was varied. Without affective priming effect ( ʳ = 0), the candidate evaluations got moderated. With
affective priming effect, however, the difference got polarized and the degree of polarization
increased as affective priming effect gets stronger.
Figure 9. Affective Priming Effect and Candidate Evaluation
It is important that the model's behavior discussed so far do not depend on particular parameter
values; that is, qualitatively the same behavior can be produced under wide ranges of parameter
values. In particular, JQP will be a motivated reasoner roughly when ʳ > 0, 0 < ʴ < 1, 0 < ˁ < 1 and
its (prior) belief structure is reasonably consistent. different parameter values within these ranges









Motivated Reasoning and The Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation
The results in the above suggest that motivated reasoning is critical to account for both
responsiveness and persistence of candidate evaluation. A fundamental difference between
motivated reasoning models like JQP and standard models like Bayesian learning model is that JQP
is not a passive learner but a motivated skeptic that 'actively' reacts to the environment.
JQP does not just passively receive information and swayed by it. Rather, it distinguishes
contradictory information from consistent information and reacts to them differently, depreciating
information that challenges priors but accepting consistent information more or less at its face value.
By contrast, a Bayesian learning model does not distinguish information on the basis of consistency
with priors and gives the same weight whether it is contradictory or consistent to priors. Rather, it
updates the prior to make it a more accurate estimate of the objective character of an attitude object
(Gerber and Green 1998).
Consequently, for any set of campaign information, JQP's candidate evaluations will be responsive to
the information but at the same time tend to be persistent over time. Given the same set of campaign
messages, however, the Bayesian model's evaluations will ﬂuctuate, being pushed one way and
then the other by each piece of new information, and likely moderate over time. Figure 7 illustrates
these differences in a simplest possible setting.
To be precise, the discrepancy between JQP and the Bayesian learning model will also depend on
the nature of campaign information. If campaign information contains only consistent information, the
difference between motivated reasoning and passive learning would be minimal. By contrast, if
campaign information contains both consistent and inconsistent information, the difference will be
signiﬁcant. However, as also noted by Bartels (2002), there is little doubt that real campaigns often
involve hotted debates and attacks between candidates and thus provide a mix of pro and con
information about each candidate. There are generally reasons to both like and dislike all candidates
in a typical election.
 Conclusions
This paper examined via agent-based simulations the psychological model of candidate evaluation
proposed by Kim, Taber, and Lodge (2010). The results show that the model is consistent with a set
of well-known empirical regularities repeatedly found in electoral and psychological research,
including priming effect (spreading activation effect), affective priming effect, information order and
wording effects, and the on-line and the memory-based processing of information.
It is also shown here that the model generally implies motivated reasoning and that evaluative affect
towards candidate plays a central role in this process. In effect, the cognitive/affective mechanisms
built-into the model together make the prior knowledge more than an anchor in Bayesian updating; it
inﬂuences the ways information is processed and used to form a judgment. As a result, information
contrary to priors tends to be challenged and discounted while consistent information are taken more
or less at its face value.
Empirical data show that voters' candidate evaluations in elections are often responsive to campaign
information but at the same time tend to be persistent and polarized over time. Without motivated
reasoning, it will be difﬁcult if not impossible to simultaneously explain these dynamics.
 Appendix: Information for Replication
All results reported in this paper can be replicated using the model and information available at
http://www.openabm.org/model/2466/version/2/view.
In the simulation, all ACT-R parameters were set at their default or common values. Speciﬁcally, they
were set as follows:
      (sgp-fct :rt 0 :bll 0.5 :ans 0 :pas 0 :pm t)    
Here, :rt 0 sets the retrieval threshold at 0 so that memory objects whose accessibility is less than 0
become inaccessible. :bll 0.5 sets the memory decay parameter at 0.5 ( d = 0.5), which has emerged
as a common value from many applications (for more details, see Anderson et al. (2004)). :ans 0 and
:pas 0 are equivalent to setting the noise parameter at 0 ( ˃ = 0). Finally, :pm t enables partial
matching for procedural knowledge, which is common in most ACT-R applications. All other
parameters not speciﬁed here were set at their default values. Notes
1 NAES 2000 is the ﬁrst survey conducted daily for more than a year to cover the entire span of US
presidential election.
2 ACT-R is a leading theoretical and modeling framework used in cognitive science for a wide range
of behaviors, among them language comprehension, the recognition and recall of information,
inferencing, the formation of beliefs, and the learning of complex skills. However, while ACT-R
provides comprehensive sets of cognitive mechanisms for learning, it lacks affective mechanisms,
which are essential for the models of political judgment.
3 For details, see Kim, Taber, and Lodge (2010).
4 There is also a separate equation for it. For details, see Anderson (1993).
5 More speciﬁcally, the evaluative implication of "Bush is honest" is constructed with the node 'Bush'
and 'honest' held in WM and thus inﬂuencing the accessibilities of other objects in LTM via spreading
activation and affective priming effect. As a result, 'hypocritical', 'stubborn', and "pro-life" are likely to
become most accessible. For details, see Kim, Taber, and Lodge (2010).
6 The initial attitudinal stability and baseline accessibility of trait concepts were uniformly set at the
maximum of those for political concepts (i.e., when survey response rate is 100%).
7 Potential information source effect was ignored for simplicity. To be speciﬁc, " James says
Edwards supports tax-cut" is equivalent to " Edwards says Edwards supports tax cut" in this
experiment. But this simplifying restriction does not change the major results of the study.
8 On reading "Edwards", node Edwards is retrieved into WM. Here "support" does not play any
signiﬁcant role. For more details about the internal processes, see Kim et al. (2010).
9 The valences of the information were -0.67 and 0.67 respectively, which was the same across
James and Edwards for all ideological agents.
10 The updating rule was Evalt = (1 - a) * Eval t-1 + a * infot where a = 0.1.
11 Kim et al. (2010) also considered a more general version of Bayesian learning model (Gerber and
Green, 1998). However, it does not make any difference. The general model does not distinguish
consistent and contradictory information either, which is what matters for the result of this study.
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